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Abstract
Low-income people have less access to opportunities for post-secondary education, and the
welfare reform in 1996 further limited access for welfare recipients. Since welfare reform, there
has been an increasing interest in strategies meant to enhance the well-being of low-income
people through education and the development of human capital. In this study, we examine how
low-income people saved for post-secondary education in Individual Development Accounts
(IDAs) in a nationwide demonstration. IDAs are structured accounts that provide matches for
savings used for home purchase, microenterprise, retirement savings, and post-secondary
education. We examine how savings outcomes differed between participants who intended to use
their savings for post-secondary education and other participants.
Results indicate that low-income people can save and build assets for post-secondary education
in IDAs. Furthermore, saving for post-secondary education moderates some relationships
between savings outcomes and other characteristics of participants and of IDA programs. Finally,
we discuss implications for policy and social-work practice for using IDAs to promote the
development of human capital by low-income people.

Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that education has a wide variety of positive
economic and social effects on individuals, families and society as a whole (Becker, 1993;
Beverly & Sherraden, 1997). Furthermore, the returns to education in the labor market have
increased since the early 1970s (Mishel, Bernstein & Schmitt, 1997; Mishel & Burtless, 1995).
Studies have found that the rise in earnings inequality during the past two decades is closely
related to differences in educational attainment (Amott, 1994; Bernhardt & Dresser, 2002). In the
meantime, despite the fact that both men and women in general have made steady progress in
their levels of education over the years, low-income people and other disadvantaged groups have
faced decreasing access to opportunities for post-secondary education (Mortenson, 2000).
Among the many factors related to low access of low-income people to post-secondary education,
inadequate financial resources is one of the most important ones (Boldt, 2000; Gittell, Gross, &
Holdaway, 1993). In particular, the increasing costs of college and the cuts in need-based
financial aid have made post-secondary education less affordable for many low-income people
(Mortenson, 2000; Sherraden, 1991). The welfare reform of 1996 has focused on work
requirements and has further limited access to post-secondary education for welfare recipients.
Low-income people may often be forced to make short-term decisions about investment in their
own human capital, and it is important for social policy to help them save and invest for their
future education.
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) is an approach to help low-income people save and
accumulate financial assets for post-secondary education. IDAs are targeted to low-income
people and provide incentives and an institutional structure conducive to saving (Schreiner, et al.,
2001). IDAs provide participants with matches for savings used for home purchase,
microenterprise, retirement savings, and post-secondary education. This paper investigates the
following questions: Do IDA participants who intend to use their savings for post-secondary
education have different savings outcomes than other IDA participants? And if so, what
demographic factors and program-design characteristics are associated with the differences?
Answers to these questions may provide lessons that will help guide modifications to IDA policy
and program design in ways that might improve savings outcomes for those intending to use
their IDA for post-secondary education.
Background
Access to Post-Secondary Education for Low-Income People
The rising costs of college and the decline of social investment in higher education since the
early 1980s have made post-secondary education less affordable for low-income households.
According to Mortenson (2000), in the 1990s, both the federal government and some states have
moved from need-based financial aid to merit-based aid. In addition, the federal government has
aggressively expanded educational loan programs in the past two decades, with more of the costs
of these programs borne by borrowers instead of taxpayers. These factors made college less
affordable for low-income people, especially considering that college aid previously had greater
impact for the poor than for the non-poor (Dynarski, 2002). Related to these changes, gaps in
educational attainment by income level started to widen in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, by
the mid-1990s, a student from a family in the top income quartile was 10 to 12 times more likely
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than a student from the bottom quartile to have completed a bachelor’s degree by age 24, but in
1970 and 1980, the numbers were 6 and 4 (Mortenson, 2000).
Beyond these changes to college costs and the structure of financial aid, welfare reform made
post-secondary education—especially four-year college degrees—more difficult for low-income
people. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) block grant (U.S. Congress, 1996). This law transformed the 60-yearold welfare system into a work-based system which requires states to place increasing
percentages of adults in work or work-related activities. Major changes under the PRWORA
include work requirements, time limits on receipt of cash assistance, and greater control of
program rules by states.
TANF’s work-participation mandates have shifted the focus of welfare-to-work programs away
from education and training toward immediate job placement. The new system of welfare
provision includes a number of regulations that discourage welfare recipients from pursuing
post-secondary education. First, TANF is designed to place recipients directly into jobs. States
are penalized unless they put a large share of their adult recipients into work programs. This
makes states less likely to provide education or meaningful job training. Second, job programs
under TANF are narrowly defined, and most post-secondary education and job training do not
count as “work”. For example, recipients enrolled in post-secondary education for longer than a
12-month period are, for the most part, excluded from a state’s calculation of its workparticipation rates (Greenberg, Strawn, & Plimpton, 1999). Third, recipients are limited to 60
months of benefits (whether or not consecutive), and states can specify shorter time limits. Poor
women with children and limited resources will need more than four years to finish a Bachelor’s
degree (Mathur, 1998; Naples, 1998). These factors can greatly reduce welfare recipients’ access
to post-secondary education, especially 4-year college degrees. Jacobs and Winslow (2003) show
that in the last few years, the college attendance of welfare recipients has decreased.
The “quick labor-force attachment model” assumes that those who take low-paying or part-time
jobs will eventually move up to higher-paying and full-time jobs (Pavetti & Acs, 2001). While
welfare reform has decreased welfare caseloads, research has consistently found that those who
leave TANF often have unstable jobs and face precarious financial circumstances (Anderson &
Gryzlak, 2002; Johnson & Corcoran, 2003; Loprest, 2001). At the same time, studies have
consistently found that welfare recipients who had college degrees earned more than those
without college degrees (Karier, 1998; Mathur, 2004). This research has sparked an increasing
interest in human-capital development strategies to enhance long-term self-sufficiency among
welfare recipients (Strawn, 2004). Individual Development Accounts are one approach.
Asset-based Theory, IDAs, and Post-Secondary Education
Asset-based welfare theory was proposed by Sherraden (1991) and highlights the importance of
assets rather than income. In this perspective, assets bring security, and maybe more importantly,
assets may stimulate and facilitate the development of human capital. Consistent with the notion
of social investment in developmentalism (Midgley, 2003; Sen, 1999), asset-based welfare
theory emphasizes opportunities to build assets strengthen human capacities.
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Based on this theory, IDAs were designed to help low-income people build assets for long-term
development, including post-secondary education (Sherraden, 1988; 1991). Deposits are made in
IDAs by low-income participants. Others could also make deposits, perhaps related to milestones
such as completing a year of schooling or graduating from high school. Withdrawals for postsecondary education would be matched, with higher match rates for poorer participants. In
contrast to the current emphasis on loans and debt to pay for college, IDAs would promote a
system of savings and assets.
At the state level, asset building and IDAs are already an important policy theme. For example,
PRWORA allows states to set up IDA programs with TANF funds and to exclude IDAs balances
as countable assets for the purpose of qualifying for benefits. As of this writing, 22 states include
post-secondary education as a matchable use of their IDAs (Edwards & Gunn, 2002). IDA
programs outside the United States have focused on post-secondary education (Boshara &
Sherraden, 2004). For example, Canada has embarked on an asset-building demonstration (called
“Learn$ave”) that provides matches for post-secondary education and microenterprise. In
Western Europe, national Individual Learning Accounts (ILAs) resemble IDAs for postsecondary education. Participants in the Saving Gateway, a pilot asset-building program in the
United Kingdom, indicated that education and training were the only restrictions on matched
withdrawals that they would find acceptable (Kempson, McKay, & Collard, 2003). In sum,
matched savings for post-secondary education a new policy theme that is being tested both in the
United States and elsewhere.
Purpose of the Study
Can low-income people save for post-secondary education in IDAs? How do their savings
outcomes differ from those of participants who are saving for other purposes such as home
ownership or microenterprise? Given the rapid development of IDA programs, these are
important questions. This study addresses these questions through an analysis of data from the
American Dream Demonstration (ADD), a national IDA project. As far as we know, this is the
first quantitative research on how low-income people save for post-secondary education in a
structured, matched savings program.
Data and Methods
ADD Programs
ADD was a national demonstration of IDAs for low-income people. The 14 IDA programs in
ADD were run from 1997–2001 by 13 not-for-profit host organizations (one host had two
programs) which include community development organizations, social-service agencies, credit
unions, and housing organizations. A consortium of private foundations provided funding. All
programs in ADD provided matches for home purchase, microenterprises, and post-secondary
education, and some programs also provided matches for job training, home repair, or retirement
savings. Match rates ranged from 1:1 to 7:1, with the most common rate being 2:1.
The savings data are unusually accurate, as they come directly from the monthly passbook
savings-account records of the depository institutions.
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Participants
As of December 31, 2001, ADD had 2,353 participants. A participant is defined as an enrollee
with at least one account statement, whether or not he or she later dropped out (Schreiner, Clancy
& Sherraden, 2002). Important characteristics of ADD participants are presented in Table 1.
Most participants were female (80 percent), and nearly half were African-American (47 percent).
Almost half were never-married (49 percent). About 58 percent had attended some college or
had some type of college degree, and 82 percent were employed (full-time or part-time).
Compared with the general low-income population (Schreiner et al., 2001), ADD participants
were more educated and more likely to be employed. On the other hand, compared with the
general low-income population, a higher proportion of ADD participants were women, AfricanAmerican, or never-married. These comparisons suggest that ADD participants tended to be
somewhat disadvantaged members of the “working poor”.
Measurements
The dependent variable in this study, Average Monthly Net Deposits (AMND), is defined as
matchable deposits plus interest minus unmatched withdrawals, divided by the number of
months of participation. AMND measures net deposits but also controls for the length of time
that a participant has saved. All else constant, greater AMND implies greater saving and asset
accumulation in IDAs.
The independent variables include important program-related factors (also known as
“institutional” factors) and participant characteristics. Program factors include the match rate,
match cap, financial education, and whether participants used direct deposit into their IDAs.
Participant characteristics include demographic information (gender, age, marital status,
race/ethnicity, number of children, and number of adults), education and employment status,
household income, bank-account ownership, home ownership, and receipt of AFDC/TANF. The
regression also includes a yes/no variable that indicates whether a given participant was an
“education saver” who made a matched withdrawal for post-secondary education or who
declared at enrollment that he or she intended to make such a matched withdrawal. There are two
major reasons that we include participants who have not made matched withdrawals as
“education savers”. First, the time window for the data does not catch participants who made a
matched withdrawal after the end of the “savings period”. This group includes a large share of
intended “education savers”. Second, further analyses indicate that there are no significant
differences between “intended education savers” and “actual education savers” in terms of their
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Similar yes/no indicator variables are also
included to mark participants who declared an intention to save for home purchase, home repair,
microenterprise, retirement saving, or job training. Finally, the regression model includes
interaction terms between the indicator for “education savers” and all the other independent
variables.
Analysis
Multiple regression was used to examine how Average Monthly Net Deposits in IDAs might
differ between “education savers” and others in ADD. AMND was regressed on program factors,
participant characteristics, and interactions between the indicator for “education savers” and all
other independent variables. After list-wise deletion of cases with missing values, the regression
sample encompassed 1,979 cases. This model simultaneously estimates how the savings outcome
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is associated with program and participant factors, with being an “education saver”, and how
being an “education saver” moderates the associations between AMND and other program and
participant characteristics. Specifically, the coefficient on the (non-interacted) indicator for
“education savers” is an estimate of the link between characteristics that are omitted from the
regression that are associated with both “education savers” and AMND. The interaction effects
provide estimates of how being an “education saver” moderated the associations between
AMND and program and participant characteristics. Overall, the model intends to examine both
whether “education savers” are different from other savers and, if they are different, why.
Researchers often attempt to assess moderating or interaction effects indirectly through subgroup
analysis (Coulton & Chow, 1992). The “sub-group” approach runs two regressions, one with
only “education savers” and one with all others. The “interaction” model used here is to be
preferred over the “sub-group” approach, mostly because there is no rigorous way to compare
coefficients between two different regressions because the sample sizes and error terms differ
(Coulton & Chow, 1992; Koeske, 1992). The coefficients across the regressions might look
similar or different, but there is no straightforward way to test whether the apparent
different/similarities are statistically significant. With the “interaction” model used here, in
contrast, the p-value on a given coefficient of the interaction term immediately and transparently
indicates whether being an “education saver” moderates that characteristic, and an F test for all
the interaction terms as a group (along with the stand-alone “education saver” indicator) can be
used to see whether “education savers” differ overall from other participants.
Results
Sample Characteristics
There were 377 “education savers” in ADD. Of these, 40 percent had made matched withdrawals
as of the cut-off date of the data, accounting for 21 percent of all the ADD participants who had
made matched withdrawals at that point. Table 1 compares the characteristics of “education
savers” and other participants. Compared with others, “education savers” were younger, more
likely to be never-married, and had fewer children at home. They were also less likely to be
females and less likely to be African-American. “Education savers” also had less income, were
less likely to be working full-time, and were less likely to receive welfare. Overall, these features
are consistent with the fact that a larger share (22%) of “education savers” were already students
when they opened their IDAs than other savers (6%).
Regression Analysis of Savings Outcomes
The mean value of AMND of “education savers” was $19.80 (mean AMND for others was
$18.40). Table 2 displays the results from the regression analysis on AMND. The model as a
whole was statistically significant (p ≤ 0.01) and explained about 22 percent of the variance in
the dependent variable.
Effects of program and participant factors. Three of the four program factors were related to
AMND. Participants who had higher match caps and those who used direct deposit saved more.
Hours of financial education was also positively linked with AMND. Higher match rates,
however, were negatively associated with AMND. Specifically, participants with match rates 4:1
to 7:1 saved less than those who had match rates ranging from 1:1 to 3:1. Schreiner (2004) finds
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similar results, consistent with IDA participants being “target savers” for whom a higher match
rate allows reaching a given asset-accumulation target with less saving.
Four demographic characteristics of participants were related to AMND: age, gender,
race/ethnicity, and number of adults. Female participants saved more than male participants.
Older participants and those having more adults in households had higher AMND. Other factors
in the regression constant, AMND was higher for Caucasians than for African Americans.
Among participants’ socioeconomic characteristics, IDA savings were higher for those who
attended some college or who had a degree. Also, participants with higher household monthly
incomes saved more. This association, however, was weak; a $1 increase in monthly income was
associated with about $0.003 more AMND. Home owners and bank-account owners also saved
more than renters or the unbanked.
Savings for post-secondary education. Variables related to “education savers” (the stand-alone
indicator and the interaction terms) explained about 2 percent of the variance in AMND. As a
group, the variables related to “education savers” were statistically significant (p < 0.05),
suggesting that savings outcomes were indeed different for “educational savers”.
What factors were related to the differences? Table 3 indicates that being an “education saver”
moderated the associations of several program and participant factors on AMND. Among
program factors, the interaction with hours of education was positive and statistically significant.
While an additional hour of financial education was linked with $0.49 more AMND for any
participant, regardless of whether they were an “education saver”, an additional hour was
associated with an additional $0.71 for “education savers”. Apparently, “education savers”
derived greater benefits from financial education than did others. Thus, an additional hour of
financial education was associated with $1.20 ($0.49 plus $0.71) more AMND for “education
savers” but only $0.49 more AMND for others.
The interaction of education savers and match rates was also positive and statistically significant.
The education savers with match rate of 3:1 saved much more than those with match rates
between 4:1 and 7:1. Perhaps “education savers” are more likely than others to be “target savers”
for whom higher matches rates are associated with dampened savings.
Among participant demographic factors, savings for post-secondary education moderated the
association of gender with AMND. While females in ADD on average saved $2.56 more than
males, female “education savers” saved $9.05 less than female “non-education savers” and $6.49
($9.05 – $2.56) less than male participants. Thus, the association of gender with savings flips for
“education savers”.
Similarly, although married participants on the whole in ADD had higher AMND than notmarried participants (p-value of 0.30), married “education savers” saved $11.88 less than
married “non-education savers” and $10.02 ($11.08 – 1.86) less than non-married participants.
For whatever reason, married participants and female participants who planned to use their IDAs
for post-secondary education saved much less than others.
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Turning to the interactions with participant socioeconomic factors, home owners who were
“education savers” saved $7.89 more than home owners who were not “education savers” and
$11.61 ($7.89 + $3.72) more than renters. It appears that home ownership promotes saving,
especially for post-secondary education. Perhaps unsurprisingly, students who were “education
savers” saved $10.14 more than did students with different asset-accumulation goals. Perhaps the
immediate saliency of the use of IDAs helped students to save for post-secondary education. Or
perhaps students shifted existing savings or financial aid into IDAs to take advantage of the
match. In any case, it is clear that, among “education savers”, students saved more than nonstudents.
Discussion and Implications
Discussion
We underscore several findings. First, being an “education saver” seems to strengthen the
associations of some program factors with savings performance. For example, “education
savers” seemed to benefit more from financial education than did others, perhaps because a
higher percentage of education savers were students. Being a student might signal a greater
motivation to learn and perhaps also better learning skills inasmuch as students are used to
classroom learning and homework. The association between higher match rates and lower IDA
savings was also stronger among “education savers”. The ADD data cannot reveal the reason for
this, but it may be that “education savers” are also more likely to be “target savers” (targeting,
for example, tuition).
Second, being an “education saver” also moderates the relationship between several participant
characteristics and AMND. Female “education savers” saved much less than other female savers,
although female participants who were not “education savers” saved more than males. Why did
female “education savers” save less? In ADD, 81 percent of female participants had at least one
child at home, and 66 percent of these women were single mothers. These women and single
mothers may face unique obstacles (for example, the need for child care) in their pursuit of postsecondary education. If they realize that they face these obstacles only after enrolling in IDAs
and declaring their intent to save for post-secondary education, then this may explain their lower
savings. Of course, another possible reason is that TANF rules act as limits on the access of
welfare recipients to higher education, and low-income women with children are those most
likely to be affected by TANF or—even if they are not currently on welfare—those who expect
to possibly be affected by TANF rules in the future.
Married “education savers” also saved much less than other married participants. Perhaps
married participants who planned for post-secondary education found that going to school (or
going back to school) was more difficult than single participants. For example, married
participants may face responsibilities (for example, childcare) or barriers within the household
(form example, unsupportive spouses) that men or unmarried women do not have.
“Education savers” who were students saved more than “education savers” who were not
students. More than half of “education savers” either had some college education (38%) or
already had a college degree (22%). Perhaps the pressures of paying for their education make
saving for post-secondary education more salient for student savers. They do not have to think
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very far into the future to see how IDAs will be useful. In contrast, participants who are not
already students are saving for a further-off goal and thus may end up savings less.
As a caveat on the interpretation of these results, note that participants in ADD were both
program-selected and self-selected (Schreiner et al., 2001). Therefore, ADD participants are not
representative of the general low-income population.
Implications
The findings of this study indicate that low-income people did save for postsecondary education
in ADD. Thus, it may be helpful to include more low-income people in the college-finance
toolkit. For example, teaming IDAs with State College Savings Plans (“529 plans”) is one
strategy to promote more inclusive IDAs for post-secondary education (Clancy, 2003; Clancy &
Sherraden, 2003). After-tax contributions to 529 plans accumulate tax-free and are not taxed
upon withdrawal if used for expenses for post-secondary education. All states but one sponsor
529 plans, and some states (Rhode Island, Michigan, and Louisiana) encourage savings by lowincome households through matching provisions (Clancy, 2003). Given that 529 plans are run by
government and that the government is a potential source of match funds, linking IDAs and 529
plans could help include more low-income households in subsidized savings policies aimed at
post-secondary education.
Our findings indicate that savings outcomes were different for “education savers” and that being
an “education saver” moderated the associations of some other program and participant factors.
These findings may help programs design IDAs that help improve outcomes for “education
savers”. For example, financial education was associated with greater savings for “education
savers” than for others, probably because most of the education savers were already students and
thus were better at being students than are non-students. This may imply that financial education
in IDAs is not very appropriate for adults and other non-students. Therefore, adopting the
principle of adult education more completely in financial education of IDA programs may help
address this concern. Hogarth and Swanson (1995) highlight the importance of applying adult
education principles to financial education for low-income people, especially the importance of
understanding participants’ life context and experiences and bringing them into the teaching and
learning process.
We also found that students save better for post-secondary education than non-students. This
implies that salient goals may help savings. Therefore, IDA programs may be able to encourage
greater savings outcomes by helping to make savings goals salient, for example by role-playing
the act of making an asset purchase.
Finally, we found that household roles and household constraints on participants may affect
savings for post-secondary education. For example, being married and/or being a woman was
associated with lower savings for “education savers”. These participants may benefit from
additional help to achieve their savings goals for post-secondary education.
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Table 1. Characteristics of ADD Participants and Comparisons of Education Savers and
Non-Education Savers
Education
Savers (N=377)

Non-education
Savers
(N=1,976)

Continuous Variables
Age
Number of adults
Number of children
Household monthly income

Mean
30
1.4
1.5
$1,252

Mean
37
1.5
1.8
$1,402

Categorical Variables
Gender
Female
Male
Race/ethnicity
White
African-American
Others
Marital Status
Never married
Divorced, Separated , or
Widowed
Married
Education
Did not Complete High
School
Completed High School or
GED
Some College Education
(no Bachelor’s Degree)
Completed 4-year Degree
or More
Employment
Employed Full-time
Employed Part-time
Not working or
Unemployed
Students
Banked
Home Owner
Receipt of AFDC/TANF
Formerly
Currently

Percents

Percents

74
26

81
19

8.37**

80
20

41
35
24

37
49
14

2.77
26.4***
22.9***

37
47
16

66
19

46
31

52.18***
24.81***

49
29

15

23

10.59**

22

20

15

5.96*

16

20

27

6.82**

26

53

51

0.36

51

7

7

0.04

7

41
28
9

62
22
10

56.43***
7.56***
0.75

59
23
10

22
75
14

6
77
16

100.01***
0.55
1.39

8
77

30
7

39
11

11.0***
3.26

38
10

*p < .10, **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Comparisons
of Education
and Noneducation
Savers
t / χ2
-11.3***
0.68
-3.36**
-3.80***

ADD
Participants
(N=2,353)

Variables

Mean
36
1.5
1.7
$1,378
Percents

Table 2: Regression Analysis on Average Monthly Net Deposits (AMND)

Institutional Characteristics
Match Rate
(4:1 to 7:1)
1:1
2:1
3:1
Monthly Savings Target
Use of Direct Deposit to IDAs
Hours of General Financial Education
Participant Characteristics
Age
Female
Race/Ethnicity
(Caucasian)
African-American
Others
Marital Status
(Never Married)
Married
Divorced, separated or widowed
Number of children
Number of adults
Education
(No High School Diploma)
High School Graduates
Some College, Less than Bachelor’s
Degree
Bachelor’s Degree or More
Employment
(Unemployed or not working)
Employed, full-time
Employed, part-time
Students, working or not working
Household Monthly Income
Home Owner
Having Checking or Savings Account
Receipt of Public Assistance
(TANF or AFDC Never)
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF or AFDC currently
Intended Users of education
Intended users of home purchase
Intended users of home repair
Intended users microenterprises
Intended users of retirement
Intended users of job
F
R2
N

Main Effects
Coefficient p-value

Interaction Effects
Coefficient p-value

7.76***
6.94***
9.67***
0.18***
3.95*
0.49***

0.003
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.08
0.001

5.19
10.17
13.06*
0.08
6.69
0.71***

0.49
0.15
0.08
0.21
0.35
0.003

0.16**
2.56*

0.01
0.09

-0.06
-9.05**

0.72
0.01

-7.87***
1.68

0.001
0.33

3.50
6.23

0.29
0.11

1.86
0.19
-0.64
2.33**

0.30
0.89
0.12
0.01

-11.88**
-0.75
1.11
-0.85

0.02
0.85
0.31
0.71

0.91
2.92*

0.62
0.09

-1.07
3.75

0.83
0.41

8.96***

0.001

8.96

0.19

-1.90
0.04
1.11
0.003***
3.72**
5.27***

0.34
0.98
0.70
0.003
0.04
0.001

0.26
2.46
10.14*
0.003
7.89*
-2.94

0.96
0.65
0.09
0.25
0.07
0.41

-2.02
-0.14
-10.41
5.88
12.83
6.92
10.33
5.14
9.71
0.22
1,979

0.13
0.95
0.55
0.65
0.32
0.59
0.43
0.70

4.95
-6.30
-------

0.17
0.27
-------

*p < .10, **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

13

